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		<title>Leaked cables: U.S. bullying Europe into transatlatic biometrics matching</title>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 05 Oct 2011 09:35:31 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[Biometrics matching in Europe In 2003 the German minister of the interior Otto Schily started an initiative that led to the signing of the Pr&#252;m Convention in 2005. Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium agreed in that convention i.e. to provide each other mutual on-line access to their police fingerprint and DNA databases. [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Biometrics matching in Europe</strong></p>
<p>In 2003 the German minister of the interior Otto Schily started an  initiative that led to the signing of the Pr&#252;m Convention in 2005.  Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium  agreed in that convention i.e. to provide each other mutual on-line  access to their police fingerprint and DNA databases. Every country can  match fingerprints and DNA data with the other countries databases and  see whether information on that person is available there (&#8222;hit/no hit&#8220;).  If there is a hit, more information can be requested in a more formal,  manual procedure. But the mere fact of a person being registered in a  database on (suspected) criminal offenders can obviously result in  troubles. Germany, for example, has registered 3 million fingerprints  and 500&#8242;000 DNA samples in police databases.</p>
<p>The leaked U.S. embassy cables recently <a href="http://cablesearch.org/">published</a> reveal that as early  as 2006 the U.S. government began discussions with Germany on what parts  of the Pr&#252;m Convention &#8222;might be fruitful for the U.S. to pursue with  Germany as a prelude to an agreement with the Pr&#252;m group of EU  countries&#8220;. It should be noted that the major difference between  exchanging such information among European countries and with the U.S. is that human  rights are not protected adequately in the U.S. That is why agreements with the U.S. can never be called &#8222;Pr&#252;m-like&#8220;.</p>
<p><strong>The pilot U.S.-German biometrics matching </strong><strong>agreement</strong></p>
<p>The U.S. and Germany established a working group in 2006. In the first  meeting in December of 2006, German officials asked important questions:</p>
<ul>
<li>Would the U.S. use any data Germany provided for renditions?</li>
<li>Why had so many travelers complained about U.S. port of entry systems?</li>
</ul>
<p>These problems were not resolved. There is  nothing to effectively prevent the U.S. from using  hit/no hit information for renditions to &#8222;black sites&#8220;, extrajudicial  killings and such like. Yet it was Germany, namely ministry of the interior official Andreas Schulz, who  voluntarily offered to discuss a program to allow the U.S. to initiate inquiries  and receive information pursuant to a request, e.g. in a hit / no hit  system.</p>
<p>Schulz pointed out that the Pr&#252;m convention  envisions DNA and fingerprint data sharing for crime investigation and  prevention rather than for border entry controls. The U.S. side insisted  on using fingerprint data for border controls &#8222;in special cases&#8220; but not  routinely. Yet there is nothing in the PCSC biometrics matching agreements to  effectively or even nominally prevent the U.S. from matching every  traveller from Europe against our databases and subject them to  interrogation or arrest. In fact all visitors to the U.S. are required to  provide an image of their hands including all finger prints upon entry.  This data can be automatically matched in real-time with police  databases in countries that have signed PCSC biometrics matching treaties. Nobody knows what the consequences for matched citizens would be.</p>
<p lang="en-GB">The U.S. openly admitted that they would not comply with Pr&#252;m&#8217;s Article 34 on the &#8222;Level of data  protection&#8220;. According to that Article, each Contracting Party shall  &#8222;guarantee a level of protection of personal data in its national law at  least equal to that resulting from the Council of Europe Convention for  the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of  Personal Data of 28 January 1981 and its Additional Protocol of 8  November 2001 and in doing so, shall take account of Recommendation No R  (87) 15 of 17 September 1987 of the Committee of Ministers of the  Council of Europe to the Member States regulating the use of personal  data in the police sector, also where data are not processed  automatically.&#8220; The German side replied that Germany could not agree to a  level of data protection &#8222;lower than the EU data privacy rules&#8220;. Yet all PCSC biometrics matching agreements today ignore  the fact that there is no adequate level of data protection in the U.S.,  and no way of monitoring and enforcing even the inadequate data protection  provisions contained in the biometrics matching PCSC agreements themselves.</p>
<p><!-- 		@page { margin: 2cm } 		P { margin-bottom: 0.21cm } --></p>
<p lang="en-GB">Interestingly, the U.S. level of  protection prevented the matching of DNA profiles: U.S. law prevents direct access to the DNA  database by anyone other than the FBI lab. As the U.S. government was,  from the start, not prepared to negotiate a proper treaty to be ratified  by Congress, there was no way to overcome this issue. Therefore the  PCSC agreements&#8216; provisions on DNA sharing contain the reservation  that they shall come into effect only at a later stage.</p>
<p><!-- 		@page { margin: 2cm } 		P { margin-bottom: 0.21cm } --></p>
<p lang="en-GB">The U.S. and Germany   consequently negotiated the first agreement on transatlantic biometrics matching. In Germany negotiations were led by the ministry of the interior &#8211; despite the fact   that the biometrics data to be shared are retained for prosecuting crime which comes under the competence of the   ministry of justice. The German minister of the interior at the time was Wolfgang Sch&#228;uble, infamous for his erosion of   fundamental rights in the name of security in many ways. According to   a U.S. embassy cable, the social democrat minister of justice Brigitte   Zypries, herself a former ministry of the interior official, only &#8222;reluctantly   agreed to the landmark data sharing initiative on serious crime and   terrorism suspects (the Pruem-like agreement) due to privacy concerns.&#8220; She opposed an HSPD-6 agreement on sharing terrorism screening information, though.</p>
<p lang="en-GB">Wolfgang Sch&#228;uble, Brigitte   Zypries, Michael Chertoff and Michael Bernard Mukasey on 11 March 2008   signed the &#8222;Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of   Germany and the Government of the United States of America on enhancing   cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime&#8220; (full text <a href="http://www.bgbl.de/Xaver/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&amp;start=//*[@attr_id=%27bgbl209s1010.pdf%27]">here</a>).   Germany was criticised by its EU partners for this unilateral step   which weakened the EU&#8217;s ability to jointly negotiate an agreement that   satisfies fundamental rights.</p>
<p lang="en-GB">Negotiations had been kept secret before the date of signing. The Working Group on Data Retention (AK Vorrat) was the first to publish the agreement in 2008. The activist group <a href="http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/content/view/253/79/lang,en/">warned</a> that ratification of the agreement would &#8222;expose Germans to the risk of systematic human rights violations by U.S. authorities&#8220; and called on the German parliament to refuse ratification. &#8222;Germany is to allow an unspecified number of U.S. authorities such as law enforcement, border control and intelligence agencies to match fingerprints and DNA samples on-line with German fingerprints and DNA databases [&#8230;] Currently German laws on international cooperation permit a transmission of information only to countries with an appropriate level of data protection in place.&#8220; &#8222;Disproportionality, lack of precision and predictability, deficient purpose limitation, lack of safeguards, no effective access to the courts – this deal defaults on basically all of the preconditions set out by the German Constitutional Court for interferences with our basic rights&#8220;, criticised jurist Patrick Breyer from the Working Group. In detail, AK Vorrat criticised the PCSC agreement for the following reasons:</p>
<blockquote>
<ul>
<li>Access to the German databases is not to be conditional upon a reasonable suspicion or a specific reason. Matching would be allowed to take place arbitrarily with any person&#8217;s fingerprints and DNA, for example upon entry of tourists to the U.S.</li>
<li>The deal does not specify which U.S. authorities are to be given access.</li>
<li> The use of information obtained from Germany in the U.S. is not limited to the purpose of the request, nor is it limited to criminal proceedings. The U.S. may thus insert obtained information in mass databases for an unlimited period of time and hand it on to other U.S. authorities, whenever the U.S. believes it necessary.</li>
<li> Nobody will ever find out that their information was passed on to the U.S. Even if they knew they are given no effective right to access the information, and they cannot effectively enforce a correction of false information in the U.S.</li>
<li> Affected citizens from Europe will have no access to independent courts in the U.S. to stop erroneous or illegal measures. Nor do independent data protection authorities exist in the U.S.</li>
<li> Ignoring the low level of human rights protection in the U.S., the German ministers simply copied parts of the Prum Treaty &#8211; which had been drafted exclusively for member states to the European Convention on Human Rights &#8211; and applied them to a country where no similar guarantees exist.</li>
<li> The director of U.S. civil liberties NGO ACLU Barry Steinhardt only recently warned: &#8222;If Europe agrees to data-sharing with the United States [&#8230;], then European citizens will have far fewer protections for their data in the United States than U.S. citizens will have in Europe. U.S. privacy laws are weak; they offer little protection to citizens and virtually none to non-citizens.&#8220; <sup id="_ref-0"><a href="https://wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/intern:PE-Entwurf.en#_note-0">[1]</a></sup> In regard to the protection of human rights, the U.S. are a developing country. Its level of data protection is ranked between the Philippines and Thailand by British civil liberties NGO Privacy International.<sup id="_ref-1"><a href="https://wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/intern:PE-Entwurf.en#_note-1">[2]</a></sup></li>
<li> Countless cases document what are clearly standard procedures in the United States: The arrest of travellers from Europe upon entry to the U.S. without giving any reason, without allowing any contact to the outside world and without providing even the most urgent medical treatment; the blanket monitoring of law-abiding citizens and businesses in Europe using financial data (SWIFT) and telecommunications surveillance (ECHELON); the issuing of no-fly lists and the freezing of assets without court orders; the killing of Europeans by way of capital punishment; the abduction of people from Europe to extraterritorial camps where they are imprisoned for an unlimited period of time, without any court order, and subjected to torture.</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p lang="en-GB">Publication resulted in widespread criticism, including by trade unions (the sharing of information on trade union membership is mentioned in the agreement). The German parliament subsequently still ratified the agreement. However one chamber passed a resolution pointing out that the agreement in its present form did not satisfy fundamental rights. The state of Hamburg, represented by a green-party member minister of justice, refused to give its consent to the agreement, preventing the Federal government from bringing the Agreement into force. On 12 December 2009 the federal ministers of the interior and justice sent a letter to Attorney General Holder and DHS Secretary Napolitano that described &#8222;limitations on Germany&#8217;s ability to share information on sensitive areas (e.g. labor union membership, religious affiliation), a need to more fully define serious and terrorist crimes, as well as interpretations of some additional data protection elements&#8220; due to the concerns raised by federal states in the Bundesrat. Germany wants to negotiate an implementation agreement to address those issues. The new federal minister of justice Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger initially refused to bring the PCSC agreement into force before the concerns have been dealt with. However, after the green-party minister of justice of Hamburg stepped down, Hamburg dropped its veto against the agreement. Thus the federal government <a href="http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/069/1706965.pdf">brought</a> the agreement into force on 19 April 2011. An implementation agreement is currently being negotiated. No data has been exchanged under the agreement so far.</p>
<p lang="en-GB"><strong>The U.S. visa waiver program</strong></p>
<p lang="en-GB">In August of 2007, Congress established new requirements  for countries participating in the U.S. visa waiver program. 8USC1187 now <a href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode08/usc_sec_08_00001187----000-.html">states</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p lang="en-GB">Except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, a  country may not be designated as a program country unless the following  requirements are met: [&#8230;]</p>
<p lang="en-GB">(F)  Passenger information exchange</p>
<p lang="en-GB">The government of the country enters into an agreement  with the United States to share information regarding whether citizens  and nationals of that country traveling to the United States represent a  threat to the security or welfare of the United States or its citizens.</p>
</blockquote>
<p lang="en-GB">This provision applies to new candidates to the visa   waiver program only. There is nothing that required countries like   Germany to agree to additional information sharing. Also the provision   covers information on travellers to the U.S. only. Automated or routine information exchange, or the kind of the  information sought, is not mentioned. It is unlikely that Congress had  the sharing of information on perpetrators of serious crime for law  enforcement purposes in mind, considering that no such agreement had  been concluded at the time. The biometrics  matching PCSC agreements, in fact, are not at all aimed  at &#8222;citizens and  nationals [&#8230;] traveling to the United States&#8220;. The U.S. itself  said that such information is to be used for immigration purposes only   exceptionally.</p>
<p>Yet the U.S. Department of &#8222;Homeland Security&#8220;, in consultation with other  agencies, <a href="http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11335.pdf">determined</a> that visa waiver program countries could satisfy the legal requirement  on &#8222;passenger information exchange&#8220; only by entering into the following  three bilateral agreements:</p>
<ol>
<li>sharing lists of known and suspected terrorists according to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6),</li>
<li>sharing information on perpetrators of serious crime according to  biometrics matching agreements (officially known as Preventing and Combating  Serious Crime (PCSC) agreements), and:</li>
<li>sharing lists of lost and stolen passports (LASP).</li>
</ol>
<p>Countries joining the visa waiver program after the 9/11 Act entered  into force are required to enter into these agreements as a condition  of admission into the program. Since it is the Attorney General, in  consultation with the Secretary of State, that &#8222;may designate any  country as a program country&#8220;, the U.S. government can set conditions to  participation that go far beyond the legal requirements.</p>
<p>The U.S. embassy cables reveal that as early as in July of 2008, the  programmes set out above were presented to the government Estonia as a  condition to Estonia joining the visa waiver program. Estonia accepted  these conditions and signed the agreements required. Many other countries followed suit.</p>
<p><strong>Austrian reservations<br />
</strong></p>
<p>Negotiations  with Austria on a PCSC biometrics matching agreement are well documented in embassy cables.  Austrian officials were initially reluctant to enter into negotiations and, in  2009, asked the U.S. delegation about the following problems of the  proposed agreements:</p>
<ul>
<li>Questions focused on the application of U.S. data protection and  privacy law to non-U.S. citizens. (Even the few inadequate enforceable  data protection provisions that exist in U.S. law do not apply to EU  citizens.)</li>
<li>The Austrian side sought assurances or evidence that  U.S. law  provided protection equivalent to that in Austrian law  (knowing that there is no equivalent protection).</li>
<li>Austria thought that citizens should  have the same rights of access  to law enforcement and national security  data bases that they have to  other databases. The Austrian side asked  why the U.S. had been willing, in the Eurojust  agreement to establish  an individual right of EU citizens to seek  corrections to their  personal data, but did not propose to do so in the  HSPD-6 and PCSC  agreements.  The U.S. side explained that the right in  Eurojust to ask  did not mean that changes would be made. (sic!)</li>
<li>They focused on legal redress. Austrian data protection officials  were sceptical of the effectiveness of  data protection regimes built on  anything other than explicit legal  obligations. (PCSC agreements with  the U.S. government and the data protection assurances contained therein  are not enforceable. No European can take the U.S. government to court  over non-compliance. There is not even an independent data protection  commissioner to control the application of the provisions.) The Austrian Data  Protection Office (DPO, part of the Federal Chancellery)   outlined  constitutional provisions guaranteeing all persons individual   rights  and access to judicial redress and an effective remedy. They  (rightly) doubted  that the diplomatic mechanisms provided for in the PCSC and  HSPD-6  agreements would be adequate correctives.</li>
<li>Austria questioned the legal basis for agency programs and policies  on data protection. They pointed out that U.S. policies and programs not  specifically required by law can be changed at any time.</li>
<li>Because the data that would be exchanged under the HSPD-6 data comes from intelligence sources, its level of reliability is such that it could affect the rule of law, the DPO explained. Specifically, if an Austrian agency were to make a decision on the basis of information received from the U.S. that was then challenged in court, the Austrian court would not have the necessary access to the information to rule on the substance of the case.  Moreover, the Schengen rules that apply to operating &#8222;discreet surveillance&#8220; systems (i.e. tracking persons without plans for specific action) would not apply to the U.S. use of data provided by Austria.    There was, the DPO representatives maintained, a big difference between the case-by-case sharing of data foreseen in the PCSC and the &#8222;en bloc&#8220; sharing of data (even if very limited in nature) that the HSPD-6 would establish.</li>
</ul>
<p>Austrian newspapers reported critically on the negotiations  which prompted the U.S. to publicly deny that &#8222;there had been any U.S.  threat to the VWP&#8220;. However, the cables reveal that in November 2009, the U.S. Ambassador  did threaten that &#8222;the lack of progress could endanger Austria&#8217;s status in  the VWP&#8220;. Austria subsequently entered into a biometrics matching PCSC agreement with the U.S.</p>
<p><strong>Patchwork situation</strong></p>
<p>In 2009 the U.S. had plans to cooperate with Spain in order to broaden  their mutual PCSC agreement &#8222;into a U.S.-EU agreement&#8220;. It appears those  plans have not been pursued however.</p>
<p>As of January 2011,  the following 17 European countries have <a href="http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11335.pdf">signed</a> unilateral biometrics  matching PCSC agreements with the U.S.: Austria, the Czech Republic,  Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,  Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, and the  United Kingdom. Biometrics matching is not operational in any of those  countries so far though. The U.S. <a href="http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11335.pdf">expects</a> queries of Spain’s and Germany’s  criminal databases to be possible as of 2011.</p>
<p>Some of the countries listed above have not   completed ratification. The Netherlands, for example, are <a href="http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/welt/597921/USA-drohten-Oesterreich-mit-Visapflicht-">reported</a> to have called the   current PCSC text &#8222;unacceptable&#8220;. As of January 2011, 10 EU member states had resisted U.S. pressure to sign a biometrics matching PCSC agreement: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Sweden.  France apparently <a href="http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/welt/597921/USA-drohten-Oesterreich-mit-Visapflicht-">complained</a> about the &#8222;aggressive tone&#8220; of the U.S. side and recommended other states not to accept U.S.  demands prematurely.</p>
<p>On a side note, a memo  dated 17/10/2008 proves that there were attempts to  &#8222;accommodate a  confidential addendum to the HSPD-6 ratification  legislation&#8220; in Greece  which the public was not to see. Apparently the  Greek government  promised that they had &#8222;some ideas how to overcome  this problem&#8220;. How  often the U.S. has negotiated &#8222;confidential addenda&#8220;  to agreements and  what their content is, is unknown.</p>
<p><strong>How should Europe react?</strong></p>
<p lang="en-GB">Although the DHS has not publicly confirmed this, there  is ample evidence in embassy cables that the U.S. is threatening to remove  countries from the visa waiver program if they do not agree to hand over  personal data unrelated to travellers. In  April of 2009 the U.S. told the government of Slovenia that &#8222;completing  HSPD-6 and PCSC was essential to Slovenia remaining on the visa waiver  program&#8220;. A Belgian memo dated 21/12/2009 notes that &#8222;HSPD-6 and the  PCSC [are] required under U.S. law to remain in the program&#8220;. In  negotiations with the government of Portugal, a PCSC agreement was  claimed by the U.S. to be &#8222;mandated by the 9/11 Act for VWP countries&#8220;.</p>
<p lang="en-GB">As  it is up to the Secretary of Homeland Security to remove any country  from the U.S. visa waiver program at their discretion, there is a risk  that the U.S. might do so. However in practise this risk is small. The U.S.  <a href="http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11335.pdf">acknowledges</a> that, particularly in the larger VWP countries, such a step  would &#8222;overwhelm consular offices and discourage travel to the United  States, thereby damaging trade and tourism&#8220;. No country has ever been removed from the visa waiver program due to its refusal  to share personal data with the U.S. According to the embassy cables, the U.S. routinely threatens states that are unwilling to enter into data sharing agreements but ultimately accepts the situation with no further consequence.</p>
<p lang="en-GB">Inclusion in the visa waiver program does not make travelling to the  U.S. much easier anyway. Instead of applying for a visa a complicated electronic application via ESTA and the paying of a  fee is required which is not much of a difference.</p>
<p lang="en-GB">The systematic sharing of personal data with the U.S. violates the European Convention on Human Rights (detailed legal analysis <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/consulting_public/0005/contributions/citizens/p_breyer_citizen_en.pdf">here</a>). Any transfer of personal data to a U.S. public authority currently entails the real risk of ensuing a violation of human rights as guaranteed in the ECHR. Firstly, the processing of that information in the U.S. violates the human rights to the protection of personal data and to effective remedy. Secondly, the United States routinely violate human rights when dealing with suspected terrorists and criminal offenders, subjecting them to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, killing them extra-judicially or applying death penalty, depriving them of a fair trial, arresting and detaining them extra-judicially.</p>
<p lang="en-GB">Europe should therefore strongly reject any sharing of personal information with the United States, especially for as long as the U.S. will not ratify in a self-executing manner the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights including its First Optional Protocol as well as the American Convention on Human Rights.</p>
<p lang="en-GB">Existing PCSC and HSPD agreements should be politically terminated and, in the meantime, legally contested for violating fundamental rights.</p>
<p lang="en-GB">EU member states should agree to jointly require visa from U.S. citizens if any European country is excluded from or not included in the visa waiver program due to its refusal to share information with the U.S. It is likely that if the EU jointly rejected the U.S. demands, the U.S. would drop them. After all, the U.S. realises that excluding the EU from the visa waiver program would &#8222;overwhelm consular offices and discourage travel to the United  States, thereby damaging trade and tourism&#8220;. Yet such solidarity among EU member states is not in sight at present. Many states are willing to unilaterally give in to U.S. demands. The EU Commission, too, is <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2010-010183&amp;language=EN">unwilling</a> to negotiate on behalf of the EU an agreement covering all conditions related to the access to the visa waiver program &#8222;in view of the present situation, where already a significant number of  Member States have concluded with the U.S. agreements on terrorist  screening and agreements on enhancing cooperation in preventing and  combating serious crime&#8220;.</p>
<p lang="en-GB">There are lessons to be learned here. Let us see who will teach them.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>State of play of the revision of the EU Data Retention Directive</title>
		<link>http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/state-of-play-of-the-revision-of-the-eu-data-retention-directive/</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 30 Sep 2011 17:31:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Webmaster</dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[On 7 September EU Commission official Cecilia Verkleij presented the state of play of the revision of the EU Data Retention Directive in Berlin. Ms Verkleij is head of the sector &#8222;Access to information&#8220; (A.3.002) within the EU Commission&#8217;s home affairs directorate general. Her team is dealing with the revision of the EU&#8217;s unpopular 2006 [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On 7 September EU Commission official <strong>Cecilia Verkleij </strong><a href="http://cms.uni-kassel.de/unicms/fileadmin/groups/w_030405/Projekte/Invodas/DRD_Pr%C3%A4sentation_Berlin_07_09_2011.pdf">presented</a> the state of play of the revision of the EU Data Retention Directive in Berlin. Ms Verkleij is head of the sector &#8222;Access to information&#8220; (A.3.002) within the EU Commission&#8217;s home affairs directorate general. Her <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/staffdir/plsql/gsys_www.guide?pLang=EN&amp;pId=3703">team</a> is dealing with the revision of the EU&#8217;s unpopular 2006 data retention directive which requires the blanket and  indiscriminate collection of telephone records, and mobile phone  location and Internet data, revealing sensitive information about the  movements and social contacts of 500 million Europeans not suspected of  any wrongdoing.</p>
<p>Ms Verkleij started by jokingly pointing out that hers was the &#8222;<strong>most criminal unit in the Commission</strong>&#8220;, dealing with all issues such as the retention of communications data, of passenger data (PNR) and of financial data (SWIFT). &#8222;If you want to know about surveillance, please call us. We can advise you&#8220;, she suggested.</p>
<p>Heading the unit on law enforcement access to information, it did not come as a surprise to hear that the first <strong>policy objective </strong>the Commission is pursuing in revising the data retention directive is ensuring &#8222;access to the communications information which is necessary for combating serious crime&#8220;. (The European Court of Justice has pointed out though that the sole legal purpose of the directive is &#8222;the functioning of the internal market&#8220; on telecommunications.)</p>
<p>The unit is mainly considering <strong>amending the data retention directive </strong>in three areas: 1) define more precisely the purpose for which retained data can be used (e.g. list of crimes), 2) define more precisely the mode of access to retained data, 3) regulate the security of retained data. The Commission also intends to pursue the idea of cost reimbursement for providers (which was rejected by member states and parliament in 2006). Another idea they are considering is exempting business to business  communications from retention obligations as such data is rarely  requested. On the other hand the speaker noted that &#8222;data generated via the Internet&#8220; was becoming &#8222;increasingly important&#8220; for law enforcement. Ms Verkleij spoke out against the opinion that retaining such data was unnecessary. This thinking, she felt, was due to a &#8222;lack of experience&#8220; of law enforcement authorities with Internet data. Ms Verkleij did not consider relevant the fact that most traffic data is accessed within the first three months, as this may concern only the first request in the context of a criminal investigation and more data may be needed at a later stage of the investigation.</p>
<p>In regard to the impact of blanket retention on the fundamental right to <strong>privacy</strong>, Ms Verkleij said that other fundamental rights needed to be considered as well, namely the rights of victims of crime. Ms Verkleij interpreted Article 52 of the Fundamental Rights Charta to say &#8222;don&#8217;t kill a fundamental right, but don&#8217;t abstain [from interfering] either&#8220;.</p>
<p>The speaker pointed out that a qualified majority of member states is currently opposed to amending the data retention directive at all. Still the Commission will proceed with an <strong>impact assessment </strong>before it will decide on how the future instrument should look like. As part of the impact assessment the Commission intends to identify policy options and assess those against the different interests at stake (law enforcement, data protection and market harmonisation). Among the options will be repealing the directive, not amending it at all and options to modify it as identified through stakeholder workshops with civil society, industry, data protection authorities and law enforcement. What options specifically will be assessed Ms Verkleij would not say.</p>
<p>The Commission intends to launch a <strong>study </strong>to assess the impact of the various policy options on internal security in the EU, industry, and data protection. Ms Verkleij would not say who will be commissioned to do this study (apparently there is to be a &#8222;study group&#8220;). (I recommended that independent researchers, e.g. criminologists, should be commissioned to do the study. The worst case scenario would probably be the commissioning of the EU&#8217;s &#8222;data retention expert group&#8220; which is composed of law enforcement, industry and selected MEPs only.)</p>
<p>The study is also to examine how <strong>data preservation </strong>is applied within the EU and elsewhere, and how effective it has proven to be in criminal investigations. This is to be done by comparing the role of communications data which are available as a result of data retention obligations and those available as a result of data preservation. Ms Verkleij made it clear that nobody could argue with her that data preservation was equally effective as data retention. She did not consider data preservation an alternative to data retention in terms of getting the same results. The Commission is considering it only as a &#8222;longer term issue&#8220;. (It appears the Commission is considering data preservation only in the context of proposing an EU instrument on data preservation. They have no plans for that at present as even law enforcement representatives do not see a need for an EU instrument. I agree as there is already a provision on data preservation in the existing Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime).</p>
<p>The <strong>time schedule </strong>of the revision process has been further delayed. Apparently Commissioner Malmstr&#246;m (who voted against the directive in 2006) has asked the unit to do a &#8222;thorough job&#8220; on data retention. The impact assessment is to be presented only in <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/police/police_data_en.htm">early 2012</a>. Ms Verkleij warned that on a reasonable timeline, it could take 4-5 years to amend the directive, and it is unclear whether there will be a majority to amend it at all. Therefore the Commission intends to continue forcing Sweden, Germany, Romania and the Czech Republic to transpose the directive as it is.</p>
<p>The Commission is calling for <strong>input </strong>via <a href="mailto:home-data-retention@ec.europa.eu">e-mail</a>.</p>
<p>In the meantime Digital Rights Ireland is hoping that in October, the Irish High Court will finally refer to the <strong>European Court of Justice </strong>the question of whether the data retention directive violates fundamental rights and is therefore to be annulled completely. In my opinion, chances are good that the ECJ will follow the example of constitutional courts in Romania (2009), Germany (2010) and the Czech Republic (2011) that have all annulled data retention laws in the past. In view of the scale of damage done to fundamental rights by data retention and the lack of evidence for a statistically significant impact on crime or the prosecution of crime, the idea of indiscriminately collecting information on the daily communications of every single citizen will be ruled disproportionate and incompatible with human rights.</p>
<p>More information:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/Resources#NGOs">NGO positions on the revision of the data retention directive</a></li>
<li>AK Vorrat press release: <a href="http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/content/view/471/79/lang,en/">86 cents for one year without blanket telecommunications data retention</a> (25 Jul 2011)</li>
</ul>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Comparative test of Internet Anonymizers [updated 28/10/2011]</title>
		<link>http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/comparative-test-of-internet-anonymizers/</link>
		<comments>http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/comparative-test-of-internet-anonymizers/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Sep 2011 10:59:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Webmaster</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Metaowl-Watchblog]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.daten-speicherung.de/?p=3497</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Reports on &#8222;Hidemyass.com&#8220; identifying users to law enforcement authorities have raised awareness of the fact that not all VPN services are anonymizers, effectively protecting your privacy on the web. Your privacy is reasonably safe only with VPN providers that do not log your IP address or other personally identifiable information when signing up for, paying [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/VPN-provider-helped-track-down-alleged-LulzSec-member-1349666.html">Reports</a> on &#8222;Hidemyass.com&#8220; identifying users to law enforcement authorities have raised awareness of the fact that <strong>not all VPN services are <a href="https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Anonymizer">anonymizers</a>, effectively protecting your privacy on the web</strong>. Your privacy is reasonably safe only with VPN providers that do not log your IP address or other personally identifiable information when signing up for, paying for and using their service. Even then, providers can generally be required to keep logs needed for a specific criminal investigation, in order to identify criminal suspects (data preservation). However your privacy is reasonably well protected <strong></strong>if your online activity is traceable only while such an investigation is taking place.</p>
<p>We have been publishing and updating a <strong><a href="http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/test-internet-anonymisierungsdienste/">comparative test of VPN services</a> </strong>in German since 2009 which points out which VPN services log their users&#8216; IP addresses and which do not. Due to the current interest I am providing an English version of the short summary of the results (last updated: 02/06/2011). The test relies on information given by the providers.</p>
<table border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="1">
<tbody>
<tr valign="top">
<td></td>
<td><strong>Based in<br />
</strong></td>
<td><strong>No logging of any traffic data (not even partially or temporarily)</strong></td>
<td><strong>No e-mail port blocking<br />
</strong></td>
<td><strong>Price</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>1. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#jondonym">Jondonym</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">International</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" hspace="1" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" hspace="1" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 6,15 €/GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>2. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#tor">Tor</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">International</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>3. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#cyberghost">Cyberghost VPN</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Romania</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 0 €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>4. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#perfectprivacy">Perfect Privacy</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">International</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div>(<img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" />)</div>
</td>
<td>from 10 €/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" height="21"><strong>5. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#relakks">Relakks</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top" height="21">Sweden</td>
<td height="21">
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td height="21">
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td height="21">from 5 €/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>6. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#internetanonymvpn">Internet Anonym VPN</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Germany</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 12 €/month and 25 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>7. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#ivacy">Ivacy</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Switzerland</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 8,33 €/month or 0,50 €/GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>8. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#linkideo">Linkideo</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Jersey</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 2 €/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>9. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#xerobankshadowvpn">Xerobank/ShadowVPN</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Panama</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 10 US$/month and 10 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>10. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#swissvpn">Swiss VPN</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Switzerland</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>5 US$/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>11. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#safersurf">Safersurf</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Germany</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>5,90 €/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>12. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#witopia">Witopia</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">USA</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>3,33 US$/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>13. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#trackbuster">Trackbuster</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">-</td>
<td>
<div>-</div>
</td>
<td>
<div>-</div>
</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>14. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#yourfreedom">Your Freedom</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Germany</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 0 €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>15. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#surfonym">Surfonym Premium</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Austria</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>10 €/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>16. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#bananavpn">BananaVPN</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Cyprus</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 15 US$/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>17. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#vpnout">VPN Out</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">USA</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 8,33 US$/month and 83 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>18. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#hideway">Hideway</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Austria</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 6 €/month incl. 10 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>19. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#hotspotvpn">Hotspot VPN</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">USA</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 8 US$/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>20. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#madvpn">Mad VPN</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">China</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 9 US$/month and 5 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>21. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#vpnaccounts">VPN Accounts</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Cyprus</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 15 US$/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>22. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#tiggerswelt">Tiggers Welt</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Germany</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 3 €/month incl. 1 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>23. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#publicvpn">Public VPN</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">USA</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 5,83 US$/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>24. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#prq">PRQ Tunnel</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Sweden</td>
<td>
<div>(<img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" />)</div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 8 €/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>25. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#torrentfreedom">Torrent Freedom/ Crypto Cloud</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Canada</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 11,58 US$/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>26. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#trilightzone">Trilightzone VPN</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">International</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 6,67 €/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>27. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#anonine">Anonine</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Sweden</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 3,25 €/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>28. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#alwaysvpn">AlwaysVPN</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">USA</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 5,72 €/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>29. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#roadwarrior">Roadwarrior</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">USA</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 15,42 €/month and 15 GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>30. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#acevpn">AceVPN</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">USA</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 3,10 €/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>31. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#12vpn">12VPN</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">China</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 1,99 €/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>32. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#vpnprivacy">VPN Privacy</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Canada</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 8,27 €/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>33. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#strongvpn">Strong VPN</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">USA</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 4,33 €/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>34. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#hideipvpn">HideIP VPN</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Romania</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 6,15 US$/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>35. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#solvpn">Solvpn</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">USA</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 16,67 US$/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>36. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#yourprivatevpn">Your Private VPN</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">International</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 5 €/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>37. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#tuvpn">TuVPN</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Singapore</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 8 €/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>38. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#vpnuk">VPNUK</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Netherlands</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 6,50 GBP/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>39. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#cinipac">Cinipac</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Panama</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 10 €/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>40. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#idealvpn">Ideal VPN</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">France</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>4,90 €/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>41. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#vpnmaster">VPN Master</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Netherlands</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/ja.gif" alt="" width="11" height="10" /></div>
</td>
<td>from 3,95 €/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><strong>42. <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/?p=799#keyvpn">Key VPN</a></strong></td>
<td valign="top">Germany</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>
<div><img src="/data/nein.gif" alt="" width="9" height="7" /></div>
</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Full information is provided in the <a href="../index.php/test-internet-anonymisierungsdienste/">German article</a>.</p>
<p>Note that the test was initially conducted in 2009. Some information may be outdated.</p>
<p>Update of 28/10/2011:</p>
<p>See also torrentfreak.com: <a href="https://torrentfreak.com/which-vpn-providers-really-take-anonymity-seriously-111007/">Which VPN Providers Really Take Anonymity Seriously?</a> (07.10.2011) covering BTguard, ItsHidden, TorrentPrivacy, Ipredator, Faceless, AirVPN, VPNReactor, BlackVPN, PrivatVPN, Privacy.io, Mullvad, Cryptocloud, VyprVPN, SwissVPN, StrongVPN, Blacklogic.com, PureVPN.com, VPNTunnel.se, Bolehvpn.net and Ivacy.com.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Protect freedom of speech on-line against private policing by service providers</title>
		<link>http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/protect-freedom-of-speech-on-line-against-private-policing-by-service-providers/</link>
		<comments>http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/protect-freedom-of-speech-on-line-against-private-policing-by-service-providers/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Apr 2011 16:47:18 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[Contribution to the European Commission&#8217;s consultation on the future of electronic commerce in the internal market and the implementation of the Directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC): Summary of recommendations The concept of “specific” obligations of intermediaries to “prevent” illegal user action should be given up in its entirety. Intermediaries should only be required to remove [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: left;">Contribution to the European Commission&#8217;s <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2010/e-commerce_en.htm">consultation</a> on the future of electronic commerce in the internal market and the implementation of the Directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC):</p>
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<h1>Summary of recommendations</h1>
<ol>
<li>The concept of “specific” obligations of intermediaries 	to “prevent” illegal user action should be given up in 	its entirety. Intermediaries should only be required to remove 	illegal content upon notification.</li>
<li>Service 	providers should not be required to remove or disable access to 	information before it has been found illegal by a court of law.</li>
<li>The 	e-commerce directive should be amended to include strict 	sector-specific privacy rules for information society services.</li>
<li>Discrimination against users that legally exercise data protection 	rights must be prohibited.</li>
<li>Providers of information society services should be required to 	ensure the confidentiality of our Internet use.</li>
</ol>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>I am contributing to the consultation as a private individual and a legal professional.</p>
<p>Before answering some of the specific <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/e-commerce/questionnaire_%20e-commerce_en.pdf">questions</a> posed by the Commission, I will deal with some points of particular importance.</p>
<h2>A. Accessibility of company data protection officer (Art. 5 ECD)</h2>
<p>It is becoming more and more important that <strong>queries regarding personal data can be addressed directly to a company data protection officer </strong>where such a person has been appointed. Service providers should therefore provide the details of a company data protection officer, including his electronic mail address, which allow him to be contacted rapidly and communicated with in a direct and effective manner (article 5 ECD to be amended).</p>
<h2><a name="Intermediary_liability:_Protect_freedom_of_speech_by_stopping_pro-active_monitoring_and_.22prevention.22"></a> B. Protect freedom of speech by stopping pro-active monitoring and “infringement prevention” (Art. 14 (3) ECD)</h2>
<h3><a name="Case_study:_Inacceptable_situation_in_Germany"></a> 1. Case study: Unacceptable situation in Germany</h3>
<p>The <strong>German Federal Supreme Court </strong>(Bundesgerichtshof) interprets the liability exemptions in the e-commerce directive not to be cover applications for injunctive relief, i.e. to claims for providers to prevent illegal user activity.<a name="sdfootnote1anc" href="#sdfootnote1sym"><sup>1</sup></a></p>
<p>In consequence, the <strong>most far-reaching doctrine of contributory “liability” </strong>is being applied by German courts, called “accessory liability” (<em>St&#246;rerhaftung</em>). According to this doctrine it is not only the wrongdoer himself (direct infringer) and participants (effective promoters or helpers) that can be subject to a claim for refraining from rights infringements, but also mere accessories, including providers of information society services. Responsibility for unlawful user action is extended to all persons who &#8211; without necessarily being wrongdoers or participants &#8211; deliberately and generally causally contribute to the infringement of a third party&#8217;s right, provided they have the legal and effective means to detect and prevent the infringement.<a name="sdfootnote2anc" href="#sdfootnote2sym"><sup>2</sup></a></p>
<p>According to this doctrine, once an intermediary obtains knowledge of an infringement, it is not only obliged to remove the unlawful content but also to <strong>take all technically feasible and reasonable precautions to prevent future infringements</strong>. In other words, subject to the requirement of reasonableness, service providers are obliged to examine all user content as soon as they obtain knowledge of any unlawful content. The monitoring obligation is not limited to the detection of the unlawful content that was originally notified or to the original publisher of this content.<a name="sdfootnote3anc" href="#sdfootnote3sym"><sup>3</sup></a></p>
<p>In practice, <strong>this jurisprudence effectively forces providers to pro-actively monitor user-generated content</strong>, this being the only way they can avoid indictment.<a name="sdfootnote4anc" href="#sdfootnote4sym"><sup>4</sup></a> Culpable breach of the monitoring duty is punished by a disciplinary fine or even a prison sentence.</p>
<p>A German court that finds a provider not to have taken sufficient steps to prevent infringements will grant injunctive relief by prohibiting the provider from letting users re-publish the illegal content, <span style="font-weight: normal;">without setting out what measures the court deems necessary to prevent such infringement. The extent of the provider&#8217;s pro-active obligations is determined only when the rights holder initiates a separate procedure for alleged violation of the injunction and applies for a disciplinary fine or a prison sentence to be imposed. So providers are told which steps to take only in the judgement that imposes a fine on them. This jurisprudence causes <strong>unacceptable uncertainty for providers</strong>.<a name="sdfootnote5anc" href="#sdfootnote5sym"><sup>5</sup></a> It is impossible for intermediaries to anticipate which measures the courts will consider “reasonable”.<a name="sdfootnote6anc" href="#sdfootnote6sym"><sup>6</sup></a></span></p>
<p>This doctrine also has <strong>unacceptable repercussions on the freedom of speech </strong>on-line, because providers threatened by fines will &#8211; often using automatic and broad filters &#8211; block and prevent any content that they consider might infringe a third party right. This leads to the suppression of controversial but politically very valuable content, as intermediaries to not wish the battle on the legality of the content to be fought at their expense.</p>
<p><a name="cite_ref-9"></a><a name="cite_ref-10"></a><a name="cite_ref-11"></a><a name="cite_ref-12"></a> Furthermore, German courts tend to <strong>go very far in what measures they impose on providers to prevent future infringements </strong>by their users: It was held that there was a duty to deploy technology to automatically scan all user-generated content for potentially infringing content.<a name="sdfootnote7anc" href="#sdfootnote7sym"><sup>7</sup></a> Users that have generated illegal content in the past must be subjected to a manual examination of any future content they generate.<a name="sdfootnote8anc" href="#sdfootnote8sym"><sup>8</sup></a> To this end, all users must be identified and the anonymous use of services must be disabled.<a name="sdfootnote9anc" href="#sdfootnote9sym"><sup>9</sup></a> All user actions must be logged.<a name="sdfootnote10anc" href="#sdfootnote10sym"><sup>10</sup></a> Content regarding issues that “provoke illegal reaction” must be examined manually.<a name="sdfootnote11anc" href="#sdfootnote11sym"><sup>11</sup></a> All of these duties have been imposed not for the prevention of serious crime, but for the mere prevention of infringements of private titles including commercial rights.</p>
<h3><a name="The_concept_of_private_policing_is_failed"></a> 2. The concept of private policing is failed</h3>
<p>These “preventive duties” imposed by the courts violate article 15 of the e-commerce directive, according to which Member States &#8211; including their courts &#8211; must not impose a general obligation on providers to monitor information which they transmit or store. Injunctions lead to a <strong>de facto obligation to monitor user-generated content</strong>,<a name="sdfootnote12anc" href="#sdfootnote12sym"><sup>12</sup></a> and thus amount to a general monitoring obligation.</p>
<p><a name="cite_ref-14"></a>At any rate, <strong>the entire concept of “specific” obligations to “prevent” illegal user action is failed</strong>. In a democracy, everybody can trust in the integrity of their fellow citizens, even if it is known that this trust is sometimes abused. Fundamental freedoms constitute the foundation of justice and peace in the world.<a name="sdfootnote13anc" href="#sdfootnote13sym"><sup>13</sup></a> Freedom is the purpose of all law. Its benefits for every person as well as for society as a whole by far outweigh the harm done by its abuse. A prevention society aimed at eliminating, as far as possible, all potential risks of human behaviour and life is not compatible with European values and freedoms.</p>
<p>According to general principles of civil law, <strong>only those need to prevent harm that have created a hazard source</strong>. The exchange of information is at the roots of human nature. It is a fundamental right (article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights) and can therefore not be considered a “hazard source”. The provision of telecommunications services does not create a greater risk of rights infringements than the provision of any product or service. Typical, socially adequate and therefore legal risks do not put their originator in a position of being responsible for intentional violations committed by other people using the products and services provided.</p>
<p>Also information society services are often similar to off-line activity such as personal discussions, noticeboards, CD recorders, photocopying machines or lockers. <strong>Internet users must not be discriminated in a way that puts them under permanent scrutiny and surveillance on-line where similar activities off-line are completely anonymous and confidential</strong>, simply because the Internet makes total control technically possible. The Internet must be kept as free as the rest of our lives. In information society we must defend our freedoms if we do not want to lose them gradually.</p>
<p>Even prevention (or policing) technology that can reasonably be implemented or is industry standard must not be imposed on all service providers because of its <span style="font-weight: normal;">devastating effects on freedom of speech. <strong>Filtering technology, for example, will by its nature suppress legal content that is merely similar to illegal content. </strong>This leads to the suppression of controversial but politically very valuable content, for example critical comments on companies and products or “fair use” of intellectual property. Policing is not the job of private companies. </span></p>
<h3><a name="Recommendation"></a>3. Recommendation</h3>
<p>The concept of “specific” obligations of intermediaries to “prevent” illegal user action that is accepted in article 14 (3) and recitals 47 and 48 of the e-commerce directive should be given up in its entirety. Intermediaries should only be required to remove illegal content upon notification. The deterring effect of criminal sanctions is sufficient to “prevent” illegal user action.</p>
<p><strong>Recommendation: </strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Service providers should not be 	required to “prevent” infringements. To this end, 	article 14 (3) ECD should read: “<em>This Article shall not 	affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in 	accordance with Member States&#8216; legal systems, of requiring the 	service provider to terminate </em><span style="text-decoration: line-through;"><em><strong>or prevent</strong></em></span><em> an infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member 	States of establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling 	of access to information.</em>” 	Recitals 47 and 48 should be deleted.</li>
</ul>
<h2><a name="Intermediary_liability:_Judicial_review_is_needed_to_protect_freedom_of_speech"></a> C. Judicial review is needed to protect freedom of speech (Art. 14 (1) ECD)</h2>
<p>The current liability limitations do not sufficiently protect free speech for another reason: A service provider that is notified of allegedly illegal content is not exempted from liability under the current directive even if is has reason to believe that the content may be legal. In practise this situation leads to the <strong>removal of practically any notified content without proper assessment of its legality</strong>, resulting in major damage to free speech on-line. Providers are being put in the position of a judge which they cannot fill. If they remove content which is later considered legal by the courts, they can be faced with high damage claims by the customer/user whose content was removed. If, on the other hand, the providers refuse to remove content which is later considered illegal by the courts, they can be faced with high damage claims by rights holders.</p>
<p>A service provider that is notified of allegedly illegal content should therefore <strong>not be required to remove the content before its legality has been assessed by a judge </strong>in a preliminary procedure. Member States can design this procedure to be fast and effective. However its cost must not be borne by the provider as this would again have a chilling effect on free speech. The requirement of a court ruling is not too great a burden on rights holders. A preliminary ruling can be obtained within a day in Germany, for example. As to the cost, needy claimants can apply for legal aid. Also claimants can recover theirlegal expenses by suing the user that generated the content.</p>
<p><a name="cite_ref-15"></a>I quote the Joint Declaration of the <strong>OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media</strong> and Reporters Sans Frontières on Guaranteeing Media Freedom on the Internet:<a name="sdfootnote14anc" href="#sdfootnote14sym"><sup>14</sup></a></p>
<p>“<em>A decision on whether a website is legal or illegal can only be taken by a judge, not by a service provider. Such proceedings should guarantee transparency, accountability and the right to appeal.“</em></p>
<p>I also quote the Joint Declaration on International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of Expression of the <strong>UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion </strong>and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression:<a name="sdfootnote15anc" href="#sdfootnote15sym"><sup>15</sup></a></p>
<p>“<em>No one should be liable for content on the Internet of which they are not the author, unless they have either adopted that content as their own or refused to obey a court order to remove that content.“</em></p>
<p><strong>Recommendation: </strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Service providers should not be 	required to remove or disable access to information before it has 	been found illegal by a court of law. To this end, article 14 (1) 	(b) ECD should read: “<em>the provider, upon obtaining such 	knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable 	access to the information </em><em><strong>after it has been found illegal 	by a court of law</strong></em><em>.</em>”</li>
</ul>
<h2><a name="Internet_anonymity_and_privacy"></a> D. Ensure Internet privacy and anonymity</h2>
<p>On the Internet <strong>our every action can be tracked easily and comprehensively</strong>. Also information that was collected on the Internet is routinely lost or stolen. This situation has caused many potential users to refrain from using information society services, or even from using the Internet. For example a German poll<a name="sdfootnote16anc" href="#sdfootnote16sym"><sup>16</sup></a> found earlier this year that 50% of the polled have “often” refrained from on-line orders because they did not want to provide personal information that was required. 40% of the 19 to 29 year olds say the same. 18% even say they never order anything on the Internet because they do not want to provide personal information. 12% of the 19 to 29 year olds confirmed this.</p>
<p>The collection of unnecessary personal information on the Internet thus constitutes an <strong>obstacle to economic development and employment in Europe</strong>. Looking for short-term profits, companies are often ignoring that their user screening practises are eroding consumer trust and thus the basis of their long-term success. Internet services could be provided with little or no personal data needing to be disclosed. For example anonymous payment can be made on-line by using pre-paid micropayment cards.</p>
<p>For those reasons it is <strong>necessary to establish strict sector-specific privacy rules for information society services</strong>:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>The 	provider of an information society service shall offer the user 	anonymous use and payment of information society services to the 	extent technically feasible and reasonable</strong>. The provider shall 	offer the user anonymous use and payment of its services in 	particular where services of this kind are already being offered 	anonymously by competitors. The user shall be informed about these 	options.</li>
<li><strong>The 	provider of an information society service may collect, process and 	use personal data concerning the use of of an information society 	services only to the extent necessary to enable the user to use the 	information society service </strong>(transactional data) or to charge 	the user for the use of the information society service.</li>
<li><strong>The 	provider shall ensure that personal data generated in connection 	with the process of using information society services are erased or 	rendered anonymous as soon as possible</strong>, at the latest upon the 	end of each utilization, unless further storage is required for 	billing purposes.</li>
<li><strong>The 	provider may not make the provision of an information society 	service dependent on the supply of personal data that are not 	necessary </strong>for the provision of the service.</li>
<li><strong>The 	provider must not make the provision of an information society 	service dependent on the consent of the data subject to the 	processing or use of their data for other purposes </strong>than the 	provision of the service.</li>
<li><strong>Directive 	93/13 of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts should 	be extended to cover unfair consenting clauses </strong>concerning 	personal data.</li>
<li><strong>The provider must inform the 	user about the periods of time for which personal data is typically 	retained</strong>.</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Recommendation: </strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>The e-commerce directive 	should be amended to include strict sector-specific privacy rules 	for information society services. </strong></li>
</ul>
<h2><a name="Non-discrimination"></a>E. Non-discrimination</h2>
<p>Users that exercise data protection rights and attempt to end illegal data collection and illegal data processing practises are often <strong>silenced by terminating their contact </strong>or account. This way providers can avoid having to comply with privacy laws.</p>
<p>This situation has <strong>devastating effects </strong>not only on the user whose account was closed, but for all other users of that service whose rights cannot be enforced and also for competitors that respect privacy laws and are unfairly disadvantaged.</p>
<p><strong>Recommendation: </strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Discrimination against users 	that legally exercise data protection rights must be prohibited</strong>. 	The e-commerce directive should be amended to this effect.</li>
</ul>
<h2><a name="Confidentiality_of_our_Internet_use"></a> F. Confidentiality of Internet use</h2>
<p>The confidentiality of our Internet use must be protected not only by the access provider, but also by providers of information society services. The e-commerce directive should be amended to include a similar provision to article 5 of directive 2002/58/EC.</p>
<p><strong>Recommendation: </strong></p>
<ul>
<li>The e-commerce directive should 	be amended as follows: “<em>Member States shall ensure the 	confidentiality of the usage of information society services and the 	related transactional and subscriber data, through national 	legislation. In particular, they shall prohibit listening, tapping, 	storage or other kinds of interception or surveillance of usage and 	the related traffic and subscriber data by persons other than users, 	without the consent of the users concerned, except when legally 	authorised to do so. This paragraph shall not prevent technical 	storage which is necessary for the provision of a service without 	prejudice to the principle of confidentiality.</em>”</li>
</ul>
<h2><a name="Question_52"></a>G. Question 52: interpretation of the provisions on liability</h2>
<p><em>Overall, have you had any difficulties with the interpretation of the provisions on the liability of the intermediary service providers? If so, which?</em></p>
<p>According to articles 12-14 ECD, these liability limitations do not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority of requiring the service provider to prevent “an infringement”. <strong>It is unclear what is meant by “an infringement”.</strong> Apparently the legislator is referring to a specific infringement and not to any infringement of a kind. But what means can the provider be required to employ to “prevent an infringement”? Can ineffective measures be required that can easily be circumvented?</p>
<p>According to article 15 ECD, this provision does not prevent Member States from imposing a monitoring obligation on service providers “in a specific case” or from imposing “duties of care [&#8230;] in order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal activities”. <strong>It is unclear what is meant by a “specific case” and by “certain types of illegal activities”. </strong>How “specific” does a monitoring duty need to be? Can it extend to all users, to all content and to an unlimited period of time without being considered a “general obligation” in the sense of article 15 (1) ECD? It is also unclear what means the provider can be required to employ in order to “detect and prevent certain types of illegal activities”. Can ineffective measures be required that can easily be circumvented? Can measures be required that have severe side-effects on legal use, user privacy and free speech? Can measures be required that are unthinkable for similar off-line services, simply because they are technically feasible on-line?</p>
<p>All in all <strong>the idea of private policing and infringement detection should be abandoned </strong>as explained above.</p>
<h2><a name="Question_53"></a>H. Question 53: “voluntary” efforts to detect illegal activities</h2>
<p><em>Have you had any difficulties with the interpretation of the term “actual knowledge” in Articles 13(1)(e) and 14(1)(a) with respect to the removal of problematic information? Are you aware of any situations where this criterion has proved counter-productive for providers voluntarily making efforts to detect illegal activities?</em></p>
<p>The interpretation of the term “actual knowledge” is controversial because it is <strong>unclear whether knowledge of the illegal nature of the content is required</strong>. If a provider is notified of allegedly illegal content, it often has no knowledge of whether that content is legal or not. For this reason a court should always decide on the matter as explained above.</p>
<p>The knowledge criterion <strong>does not prove counter-productive </strong>for providers voluntarily making efforts to detect illegal activities, because those practises can be regulated in the provider&#8217;s terms of service. Obviously those contract terms must be subject to a fairness test according to directive 93/13.</p>
<p>In my opinion, <strong>private efforts to detect illegal activities should not be facilitated </strong>but, to the contrary, made compliant with the rule of law. The removal of content without the consent of its author should be banned unless ordered by the judiciary, after hearing the user. The law may provide for interim orders issued by the judiciary. Those orders should expire if not confirmed in the ordinary procedure after a certain period of time. Providers must not be allowed to remove content in their own right because this has proven to have disastrous effects on the freedom of speech.</p>
<p>I quote the Joint Declaration of the <strong>OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media</strong> and Reporters Sans Frontières on Guaranteeing Media Freedom on the Internet:<a name="sdfootnote17anc" href="#sdfootnote17sym"><sup>17</sup></a></p>
<p>“<em>A decision on whether a website is legal or illegal can only be taken by a judge, not by a service provider. Such proceedings should guarantee transparency, accountability and the right to appeal.”</em></p>
<p>I also quote the Joint Declaration on International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of Expression of the <strong>UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion </strong>and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression:<a name="sdfootnote18anc" href="#sdfootnote18sym"><sup>18</sup></a></p>
<p>“<em>No one should be liable for content on the Internet of which they are not the author, unless they have either adopted that content as their own or refused to obey a court order to remove that content.”</em></p>
<h2>I. Question 57: practices other than notice and take down</h2>
<p><em>Do practices other than notice and take down appear to be more effective? (“notice and stay down”, “notice and notice”, etc)</em></p>
<p>I regret the fact that this question exclusively aims at “effectiveness”. <strong>Proportionality and fundamental rights must be the point of departure </strong>when considering the procedure for the removal of content.</p>
<h2><a name="Question_58"></a>J. Question 58: general monitoring or filtering obligations</h2>
<p><em>Are you aware of cases where national authorities or legal bodies have imposed general monitoring or filtering obligations?</em></p>
<p><strong>German courts are imposing general monitoring or filtering obligations all the time.</strong> In order to detect potentially illegal content of a kind (e.g. Rolex imitations), they require providers, for example, to force all users to register and to prove their identity. Courts have required providers to log all user actions, to filter all user-generated content for keywords, to manually review all content generated by certain users or relating to certain topics. These requirements are far-reaching enough to make providers delete any remotely suspicious content or account, or even to move to a country outside the EU.</p>
<h2><a name="Question_59"></a>K. Question 59: filtering</h2>
<p><em>From a technical and technological point of view, are you aware of effective specific filtering methods? Do you think that it is possible to establish specific filtering?</em></p>
<p><strong>Filtering is not effective. </strong><span style="font-weight: normal;">The various methods such as checksums, keywords, manual review, user identity or examining external links have all been discussed in detail and rejected.<a name="sdfootnote19anc" href="#sdfootnote19sym"><sup>19</sup></a> If rights holders believe filtering to be effective they are free to search the Internet and use such technology themselves in order to give notice to the provider of any infringement. Policing and the enforcement of private titles is not the job of intermediaries, but of the rights holder, the police and courts. Intermediaries must be neutral where conflicting interests are colliding. </span></p>
<h2><a name="Question_60"></a>L. Question 60: technical standards for filtering</h2>
<p><em>Do you think that the introduction of technical standards for filtering would make a useful contribution to combating counterfeiting and piracy, or could it, on the contrary make matters worse?</em></p>
<p>The introduction of technical standards for filtering or even of filtering at all would be a catastrophe from a freedom of speech point of view. Instead <strong>filtering should be prohibited. </strong></p>
<p><a name="cite_ref-21"></a>I quote the Joint Declaration of the <strong>OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media</strong> and Reporters Sans Frontières on Guaranteeing Media Freedom on the Internet:<a name="sdfootnote20anc" href="#sdfootnote20sym"><sup>20</sup></a></p>
<p>“<em>In a democratic and open society it is up to the citizens to decide what they wish to access and view on the Internet. Filtering or rating of online content by governments is unacceptable. Filters should only be installed by Internet users themselves. Any policy of filtering, be it at a national or local level, conflicts with the principle of free flow of information.”</em></p>
<p>I quote the Joint Declaration on International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of Expression of the <strong>UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression</strong>, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rappo<span style="font-weight: normal;">rteur on Freedom of Expression:<span style="font-weight: normal;"><a name="sdfootnote21anc" href="#sdfootnote21sym"><sup>21</sup></a></span></span></p>
<p>“<em>Filtering systems which are not end-user controlled – whether imposed by a government or commercial service provider – are a form of prior-censorship and cannot be justified.“</em></p>
<h2><a name="Question_62"></a>M. Question 62: liability for hyperlinks</h2>
<p><em>What is your experience with the liability regimes for hyperlinks in the Member States?</em></p>
<p>The ECD liability exeptions are not being applied to hyperlinks by German courts. This has, for example, resulted in an on-line press publication being ordered to remove a hyperlink to the website of a manufacturer of software that can be used to circumvent copy protection technology, although the website can still be identified in seconds by using a search engine.</p>
<p>The liability exeptions should be extended to cover hyperlinks.</p>
<h2><a name="Question_63"></a>N. Question 63: liability for search engines</h2>
<p><em>What is your experience of the liability regimes for search engines in the Member States?</em></p>
<p>The ECD liability exeptions are not being applied to applications for injunctive relief by German courts. The liability exeptions should be extended to outlaw prevention orders.</p>
<h2><a name="Question_64"></a>O. Question 64: liability for Web 2.0 services</h2>
<p><em>Are you aware of specific problems with the application of the liability regime for Web 2.0 and “cloud computing”?</em></p>
<p>The operator of a weblog that allows for user comments or the operator of a wiki where users can post information should be considered hosting user-generated content. Yet is is unclear whether article 14 ECD covers these services. The article should be clarified or an amendment be inserted to make sure that user-generated content is covered by article 14.</p>
<h2><a name="Question_67"></a>P. Question 67: obligation to monitor</h2>
<p><em>Do you think that the prohibition to impose a general obligation to monitor is challenged by the obligations placed by administrative or legal authorities to service providers, with the aim of preventing law infringements? If yes, why?</em></p>
<p>“Preventive duties” imposed by courts in specific cases violate article 15 of the e-commerce directive. Injunctions lead to a de facto obligation to monitor user-generated content, and thus amount to a general monitoring obligation. Service providers should not be obliged to prevent infractions at all. This in explained in more detail above.</p>
<h2><a name="Question_69"></a>Q. Question 69: investment in law enforcement with regard to the Internet</h2>
<p><em>Do you think that a lack of investment in law enforcement with regard to the Internet is one reason for the counterfeiting and piracy problem? Please detail your answer.</em></p>
<p>I think that a “war on counterfeiting and piracy” cannot be won any more than the “war on drugs” that has been waged for decades. Illegal drugs today are available as easily and cheaply as never in the past today despite all efforts. The same applies to counterfeiting and copyright infringement. Beyond the traditional powers of law enforcement, all other measures to contain counterfeiting and copyright infringement cannot be demonstrated to effectively reduce these practices.</p>
<p style="font-weight: normal;">
<p style="font-weight: normal;">05/11/2010</p>
<p style="margin-top: 0.42cm; margin-bottom: 0.41cm; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; widows: 0; orphans: 0; page-break-before: auto; page-break-after: avoid;">
<p style="font-weight: normal;">
<div id="sdfootnote1">
<p><a name="sdfootnote1sym" href="#sdfootnote1anc">1</a> BGH, 	<a href="http://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=NJW 2004, 3102" title="BGH, 11.03.2004 - I ZR 304/01: Markenrecht - Haftung des Internet-Dienste-Anbieters f&uuml;r Markenv...">NJW 2004, 3102</a> (3103); DG Market, Study on the liability of Internet 	intermediaries, 	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/germany_12nov2007_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/germany_12nov2007_en.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote2">
<p><a name="sdfootnote2sym" href="#sdfootnote2anc">2</a> DG 	Market, Study on liability of Internet providers, 	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/final_report_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/final_report_en.pdf</a>, 	p. 51.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote3">
<p><a name="sdfootnote3sym" href="#sdfootnote3anc">3</a> DG 	Market, Study on the liability of Internet intermediaries, 	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/germany_12nov2007_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/germany_12nov2007_en.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote4">
<p><a name="sdfootnote4sym" href="#sdfootnote4anc">4</a> DG 	Market, Study on liability of Internet providers, 	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/final_report_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/final_report_en.pdf</a>, 	p. 51.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote5">
<p><a name="sdfootnote5sym" href="#sdfootnote5anc">5</a> DG 	Market, Study on liability of Internet service providers, 	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/final_report_en.pdf" target="_top">http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/final_report_en.pdf</a>, 	p. 67.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote6">
<p><a name="sdfootnote6sym" href="#sdfootnote6anc">6</a> DG 	Market, Study on liability of Internet providers, 	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/final_report_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/final_report_en.pdf</a>, 	p. 51.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote7">
<p><a name="sdfootnote7sym" href="#sdfootnote7anc">7</a> BGH, 	<a href="http://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=NJW 2007, 2636" title="BGH, 19.04.2007 - I ZR 35/04: Markenrecht - Unanwendbarkeit des &sect; 10 S. 1 TMG bei Unterlassungs...">NJW 2007, 2636</a> (2639 f.).</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote8">
<p><a name="sdfootnote8sym" href="#sdfootnote8anc">8</a> BGH, 	<a href="http://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=NJW 2008, 758" title="BGH, 12.07.2007 - I ZR 18/04: Wettbewerbsrecht - Verbot des Versands von jugendgef&auml;hrdenden Med...">NJW 2008, 758</a> (762) – eBay.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote9">
<p><a name="sdfootnote9sym" href="#sdfootnote9anc">9</a> OLG 	Hamburg, Urteil vom 02.07.2008 – <a href="http://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=5 U 73/07" title="OLG Hamburg, 02.07.2008 - 5 U 73/07">5 U 73/07</a> – Rapidshare.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote10">
<p><a name="sdfootnote10sym" href="#sdfootnote10anc">10</a> OLG 	Hamburg, Urteil vom 02.07.2008 – <a href="http://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=5 U 73/07" title="OLG Hamburg, 02.07.2008 - 5 U 73/07">5 U 73/07</a> – Rapidshare.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote11">
<p><a name="sdfootnote11sym" href="#sdfootnote11anc">11</a> OLG 	Hamburg, Urteil vom 22.08.2006 – <a href="http://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=7 U 50/06" title="(3 zugeordnete Entscheidungen)">7 U 50/06</a> – 	Heise-Forum.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote12">
<p><a name="sdfootnote12sym" href="#sdfootnote12anc">12</a> DG 	Market, Study on liability of Internet providers, 	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/final_report_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/final_report_en.pdf</a>, 	p. 51.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote13">
<p><a name="sdfootnote13sym" href="#sdfootnote13anc">13</a> European 	Convention on Human Rights, Preamble.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote14">
<p><a name="sdfootnote14sym" href="#sdfootnote14anc">14</a> <a href="http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.osce.org%2Fnode%2F15657&amp;date=2011-04-13">http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.osce.org%2Fnode%2F15657&amp;date=2011-04-13</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote15">
<p><a name="sdfootnote15sym" href="#sdfootnote15anc">15</a> <a href="http://www.article19.org/pdfs/igo-documents/three-mandates-dec-2005.pdf">http://www.article19.org/pdfs/igo-documents/three-mandates-dec-2005.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote16">
<p><a name="sdfootnote16sym" href="#sdfootnote16anc">16</a> Allensbach 	study in August of 2010, <a href="http://www.webcitation.org/5t9uDMnHb" target="_top">http://www.webcitation.org/5t9uDMnHb.</a></p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote17">
<p><a name="sdfootnote17sym" href="#sdfootnote17anc">17</a> <a href="http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.osce.org%2Fnode%2F15657&amp;date=2011-04-13">http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.osce.org%2Fnode%2F15657&amp;date=2011-04-13</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote18">
<p><a name="sdfootnote18sym" href="#sdfootnote18anc">18</a> <a href="http://www.article19.org/pdfs/igo-documents/three-mandates-dec-2005.pdf">http://www.article19.org/pdfs/igo-documents/three-mandates-dec-2005.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote19">
<p><a name="sdfootnote19sym" href="#sdfootnote19anc">19</a> Breyer, 	<a href="http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/verkehrssicherungspflichten-von-internetdiensten-im-lichte-der-grundrechte/">http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/verkehrssicherungspflichten-von-internetdiensten-im-lichte-der-grundrechte/</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote20">
<p><a name="sdfootnote20sym" href="#sdfootnote20anc">20</a> <a href="http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.osce.org%2Fnode%2F15657&amp;date=2011-04-13">http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.osce.org%2Fnode%2F15657&amp;date=2011-04-13</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote21">
<p><a name="sdfootnote21sym" href="#sdfootnote21anc">21</a> <a href="http://www.article19.org/pdfs/igo-documents/three-mandates-dec-2005.pdf">http://www.article19.org/pdfs/igo-documents/three-mandates-dec-2005.pdf</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">This contribution is available in the pdf format <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Contribution_electronic_commerce_2010-11-05.pdf">here</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">See also the contributions submitted by <a href="https://lqdn.co-ment.com/text/KALAphGyXcx/view/">La Quadrature</a>, <a href="http://www.article19.org/pdfs/submissions/response-to-eu-consultation.pdf">Article 29</a> and <a href="http://www.edri.org/files/EDRi_ecommerceresponse_101105.pdf">EDRi</a>.</p>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>New ECJ preliminary ruling procedure to be created</title>
		<link>http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/new-ecj-preliminary-ruling-procedure-to-be-created/</link>
		<comments>http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/new-ecj-preliminary-ruling-procedure-to-be-created/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Feb 2011 14:39:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Webmaster</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.daten-speicherung.de/?p=2814</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In the context of the proposed EU accession to the ECHR, the Commission proposes to introduce a new procedure that would allow it to seize the EU Court of Justice (ECJ) where a complaint against EU law is filed with the European Court on Human Rights. Some comments concerning the proposal: Although promising, the proposed [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the context of the proposed EU accession to the ECHR, the <strong>Commission <a href="http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/feb/eu-accession-echr-com-ds-1930-10.pdf">proposes</a> to introduce a new procedure that would allow it to seize the EU Court of Justice (ECJ) </strong>where a complaint against EU law is filed with the European Court on Human Rights. Some comments concerning the proposal:</p>
<blockquote><p>Although promising, the proposed procedure of preliminary examination of the validity of Union acts appears to be <strong>insufficient in several respects</strong>:</p>
<p><strong>1) Lack of complainant right to seize ECJ</strong></p>
<p>Not only the Commission and the respondent Member State should be entitled to make a request for having a Union act reviewed by the ECJ, but also the person bringing the complaint. It seems appropriate for the sake of equality of arms to give the applicant before the ECtHR the same right. The ECJ has <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2010-05/convention_en_2010-05-21_12-10-16_272.pdf">asked</a> the Union to ensure &#8222;prior internal control&#8220;. This can only be ensured by giving the complainant the right to seize the ECJ where the Commission and the respondent Member State choose not to.</p>
<p><strong>2) Insufficient scope of review</strong></p>
<p>The Commission suggests the scope of the assessment to be carried out by the Court of Justice should not encompass all aspects of the validity of that Union act (e.g. compatibility with other fundamental rights, competence, choice of the legal basis, respect of essential procedural<br />
requirements), in order to &#8222;streamline&#8220; the procedure and thereby reduce its length.</p>
<p>This proposal is counter-productive. In fact matters such as the choice of the legal basis or respect of essential procedural<br />
requirements are typically much easier and quicker to assess than the difficult matter of compatibility with human rights. Quite often, formal deficiencies of Union acts can result in a much quicker annulment than substantitive considerations.</p>
<p>For example, in the context of its PNR complaint, the European Parliament raised both issues of legal basis and difficult issues of proportionality and human rights. The procedure was very much shortened by the fact that the PNR acts lacked a legal basis so that the ECJ did not need to take the time to examine the difficult questions relating to proportionality and human rights.</p>
<p>Apart from the fact that limiting the scope of review is counter-productive, it is also unacceptable to citizens that an interference with their fundamental rights, although lacking a legal basis or disregarding essential procedural requirements, will still be upheld by the ECJ for lack of jurisdiction. Such limited review will in fact lead to subsequent court actions aiming at achieving a full review by means of a preliminary ruling, thus creating more legal proceedings, taking more time and leaving citizens with illegal Union acts for longer periods of time.</p>
<p>For example, the ECJ has so far twice avoided assessing the proportionality of directive 2006/24/EC (<a href="http://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=C-301/06" title="(2 zugeordnete Entscheidungen)">C-301/06</a> and <a href="http://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=C-92/09" title="(4 zugeordnete Entscheidungen)">C-92/09</a>). This has resulted in disparate national Constitutional Court decisions and in ever more actions being initiated in various Member States. Had the directive been assessed comprehensively by the ECJ in the first place, justice would have been administered much quicker and more effectively.</p>
<p><strong>3) Intervention in preliminary ruling proceedings</strong></p>
<p>Preliminary ruling proceedings before the ECJ regarding an alleged violation of fundamental rights should allow for participation of interested third parties (&#8222;intervention&#8220;). For example the data protection supervisor, a human rights organization or an interested citizen could intervene. After all if a human right is alleged to be violated by EU law, this violation would affect numerous citizens who must all be given a right to intervene and let their voices be heard (see also Article 13 ECHR).</p>
<p>Rule 44 of the European Court of Human Rights reads: &#8222;<em>the President of the Chamber may, in the interests of the proper administration of justice, as provided in Article 36 § 2 of the Convention, invite, or grant leave to, any Contracting Party which is not a party to the proceedings, or any person concerned who is not the applicant, to submit written comments</em>&#8220;.</p>
<p>A similar rule should be introduced in the Rules of Procedure of the ECJ. For it would not make sense for a third party to submit important or even decisive comments only to the ECtHR without the ECJ having the opportunity to also consider and accept such comments in its review procedure.</p>
<p>Article 40 of the ECJ statute is not sufficient in this respect as it limits applications to intervene &#8222;to supporting the form of order sought by one of the parties&#8220;. The ECJ has therefore held applications for leave to intervene in preliminary ruling proceedings to be inadmissible, arguing that Article 40 of the statute was limited to contentious proceedings rather than preliminary ruling proceedings (Order of 26 Feb 1996, <a href="http://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=C-181/95" title="(2 zugeordnete Entscheidungen)">C-181/95</a>; Order of 25 May 2004, <a href="http://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=C-458/03" title="(2 zugeordnete Entscheidungen)">C-458/03</a>; Order of 12 Sep 2007, <a href="http://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=C-73/07" title="(3 zugeordnete Entscheidungen)">C-73/07</a>; Order of 13 Jan 2010, C‑92/09).</p>
<p>If Article 40 is not extended to preliminary ruling proceedings (including the prior review proceeding that is to be created upon accession to the ECHR), there is a danger that a citizen will challenge EU law for violating the ECHR, the National Court will refer the matter to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, the ECJ may not find a violation but the ECtHR, after hearing the submissions of third parties who could not intervene before the ECJ, may come to a different conclusion. The ECJ should therefore be given the opportunity to consider and accept third party comments in preliminary ruling proceedings, including the prior review procedure that is to be created upon accession to the ECHR.</p>
<p><strong>4) Direct complaints procedure</strong></p>
<p>In the context of creating a prior review procedure, the Union should also give its citizens the right to file direct fundamental rights compaints with the ECJ where it is alleged that EU law violates their fundamental rights. In such cases it does not make sense to require citizens to seize their National Courts first as National Courts cannot annul EU law. It is not reasonable to require citizens to invest large sums of money and wait long periods of time before a referral is made (or not) to the only Court that can decide on the validity of EU law. A right to file direct constitutional complaints has proven very successful in various Member States and should be introduced at EU level, too.</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>EU seeks to demonstrate &#8222;usefulness&#8220; of blanket communications logging</title>
		<link>http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/eu-seeks-to-demonstrate-usefulness-of-blanket-communications-logging/</link>
		<comments>http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/eu-seeks-to-demonstrate-usefulness-of-blanket-communications-logging/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Oct 2010 10:34:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Webmaster</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vorratsdatenspeicherung]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data retention]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.daten-speicherung.de/?p=2617</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The EU Commission is in the process of evaluating a controversial directive 2006/24/EC that requires all Member States to compel service providers to indiscriminately collect information on any phone call, text message, e-mail or Internet connection made in the EU (data retention). An early draft evaluation report was leaked in April. The Romanian constitutional court [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The EU Commission is in the process of evaluating a controversial directive 2006/24/EC that requires all Member States to compel service providers to indiscriminately collect information on any phone call, text message, e-mail or Internet connection made in the EU (data retention). An early <a href="http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/RoomDocumentEvaluationDirective200624EC.pdf">draft evaluation report</a> was leaked in April.</p>
<p>The Romanian constitutional court <a href="http://www.legi-internet.ro/english/jurisprudenta-it-romania/decizii-it/romanian-constitutional-court-decision-regarding-data-retention.html">found</a> in 2009 that <strong>data retention per se breaches Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights </strong>and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights). The German Constitutional Courts also <a href="http://www.bverfg.de/en/press/bvg10-011en.html">declared</a> national implementing legislation to be unconstitutional earlier this year. In May, the Irish High Court <a href="http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/content/view/366/79/lang,en/">decided</a> to ask the European Court of Justice  to rule whether EU communications data retention rules violate the EU Charter  of Fundamental Rights.</p>
<p>In June 2010, more than 100 organisations from 23 European countries <a href="http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/content/view/370/79/lang,en/">asked</a> EU Commissioners Malmstr&#246;m, Reding and Kroes in a joint letter to  &#8222;<strong>propose the repeal of the EU requirements</strong> regarding data retention in  favour of a system of expedited preservation and targeted collection of  traffic data&#8220;. This has led to various <a href="http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/content/view/363/158/lang,en/">follow-up correspondence</a>.</p>
<p>In July the <strong>Commission <a href="http://wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/D11574.pdf">asked</a> EU Member States to provide more information </strong>on whether communications logs stored under the 2006 directive</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8230;have led to law enforcement results such as condemnations, acquittals, the closure or discontinuation of cases, or the prevention of crimes in particular. [&#8230;]</p>
<p><strong>Without this additional information it will be difficult for the Commission to adequately demonstrate that the Directive is useful</strong> and gives a clear security added value and that it strikes the right balance between real law enforcement interests, the costs that the market has to incur to provide the data and the sizeable impact that the retention of data has on the privacy of citizens.</p></blockquote>
<p><a name="criticism">This</a> approach to evaluating the policy of &#8222;data retention&#8220; was criticised in a <a href="http://wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/Letter_malmstroem_2010-09-03.pdf">letter of 3 September 2010</a>, and in more detail in a letter to the Commission dated 6 October 2010 [emphasis and links added]:</p>
<blockquote><p>Subject: Evaluation of the Data Retention Directive &#8211; data provided by Member States</p>
<p>Dear [&#8230;],</p>
<p>in a <a href="http://wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/D11574.pdf">letter</a> to Member States regarding the current evaluation of directive 2006/24, the Commission has asked for statistics and examples of whether retained data have actually led to specific law enforcement results such as condemnations, acquittals, the closure or discontinuation of cases, or the prevention of crimes.</p>
<p>I welcome this step towards making the evaluation more conclusive. Yet I do not believe that the requested information is sufficient to judge the necessity of the directive.</p>
<p>First of all, the question relating to the<strong> &#8222;prevention of crime&#8220; falls outside the scope </strong>of directive 2006/24 which the European Parliament has intentionally limited to the prosecution of crime. The necessity or proportionality of a measure cannot be demonstrated by referring to unintended side-effects, in my opinion.</p>
<p>Furthermore, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that <strong>the European Court of Human Rights, in its <a href="http://www.webcitation.org/5g6FzdBr4">Marper judgement</a>, criticised similar data provided by the UK government for </strong><strong>not being conclusive</strong>: &#8222;Nor do they [Home Office statistics] demonstrate that the high number of successful matches with crime-scene stains was only made possible through indefinite retention of DNA records of all such persons. [&#8230;] Yet such matches could have been made even in the absence of the present scheme [&#8230;].&#8220;</p>
<p>So in addition to the information you have asked for in your letter to national governments, it is <strong>necessary to examine whether the reported results were only made possible through the blanket and indiscriminate retention</strong> of communications records of the entire population, or whether such results could have been achieved even in the absence of such a scheme. Where retained data have led to specific results, has the introduction of a blanket retention scheme led to an increase in the number of condemnations, acquittals, the closure or discontinuation of cases, or the prevention of crimes? Did States operating with targeted instruments achieve a similar number of condemnations, acquittals, the closure or discontinuation of cases, and the prevention of crimes as States operating with blanket retention? I suggest that you ask Member States these questions.</p>
<p>I my opinion there is <strong>no need for the EU to answer the necessity and proportionality question for all 27 Member States</strong>, for all 27 Parliaments, all 27 Constitutional Courts and all 500 mio. citizens in the same way. While some Member States &#8211; and in particular governments &#8211; may believe that blanket retention was necessary to prosecute crime,<br />
other Member States (as well as most non-EU states) obviously have a different opinion. Directive 2006/24 already allows for so many different approaches to retention period, data types and data use that more harmonisation could be achieved by harmonising these parameters<br />
and, at the same time, allowing Member States to decide for a targeted approach instead of blanket retention. For example, a choice of 0 or 6 months retention period would be more harmonised than the present choice of 6-24 months. In energy policy it is accepted that if Member States can demonstrate that they can achieve the policy goal through other means, they are free not to implement the measures suggested by the EU. Why should this approach not be adopted with regard to communications data retention?</p>
<p>I would like to recall that it is not the <strong>purpose of directive 2006/24 </strong>to facilitate the prosecution of crime, but to safeguard &#8222;the proper functioning of the internal market&#8220; in light of &#8222;the various national rules adopted on the retention of data relating to electronic communications&#8220; (ECJ, case C‑301/06). National rules on data retention may be harmonised, but it is not necessary to force Member States to adopt such rules that were not even in existence before. This approach actually leads to more varying national rules on data retention and thus to less harmonisation than achieved by directive 2002/58.</p>
<p>I hope that these comments will be useful to you when reviewing the information provided by governments, and when recommending changes to directive 2006/24/EC.</p>
<p>Best regards,<br />
[&#8230;]<br />
Working Group on Data Retention</p></blockquote>
<p>In a letter to the Working Group dated 7 October 2010, <strong>EU Commissioner Cecilia Malmstr&#246;m <a href="http://wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/Letter_Malmstrom_2010-10-07.pdf">wrote</a></strong>:</p>
<blockquote><p>[&#8230;] <strong>I do not at this stage see any reason to envisage a differentiated application of the directive if the evaluation comes to the conclusion that the retention of data is necessary and proportionate.</strong></p></blockquote>
<p>On 25 November 2010, the European Commission is planning a <strong>major event on the Data Retention Directive</strong> (working title &#8222;Taking on the Data Retention Directive&#8220;). The opening session is to consist of five speeches. The keynote will be given by the Director General of DG Home Affairs, followed by four speakers – Peter Hustinx, J&#246;rg Zierke from the German Federal Police Agency, possibly the CEO of Vodafone and EDRi. The Chairman of the Civil Liberties Committee has written a letter to the Commission asking for the event to be postponed to December 7 or 8 in order to allow MEPs to participate, because Parliament is in Strasbourg on 25 November.</p>
<p>The Commission intends to submit its evaluation report and recommendations to the European Parliament and the Council in late 2010.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Enhancing privacy &#8211; Proposed amendments to data protection directive</title>
		<link>http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/enhancing-privacy-proposed-amendments-to-data-protection-directive/</link>
		<comments>http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/enhancing-privacy-proposed-amendments-to-data-protection-directive/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 04 Aug 2010 15:06:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Webmaster</dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.daten-speicherung.de/?p=2438</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The Commission is currently reviewing the data protection directive 95/46/EC. Here are some ideas on how directive 95/46 should be amended: Recital 26 says: &#8222;whereas, to determine whether a person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other person to [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Commission is currently reviewing the data protection <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML">directive 95/46/EC</a>. Here are some ideas on how directive 95/46 should be amended:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML">Recital 26</a> says: &#8222;whereas, to determine <strong>whether a person is  identifiable</strong>, account should be taken of all the means likely reasonably  to be used either by the controller or by any other person to identify  the said person&#8220;. This should be made a &#8222;shall&#8220; (not &#8222;should&#8220;) and  should be in the text of the directive (not just a recital).</li>
<li><strong>A right of action for consumer and privacy associations </strong>should be  introduced where the right to privacy is violated (Directive 98/27 on  injunctions for the protection of consumers&#8216; interests should be  extended to mention the data protection directive)</li>
<li><strong>A right of action for competitors </strong>should be introduced where the right  to privacy is violated by a business (Directive 2005/29 concerning  unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices should be extended  accordingly)</li>
<li>A <strong>privacy by design principle </strong>should be introduced. The design of  commercial information technology products must default to conformity  with privacy legislation (e.g. web server software)</li>
<li><strong>Manufacturers should be liable </strong>where unsafe technology leads to data  protection breaches. Product liability law should cover data breaches  caused by unsafe information technology products (directive 85/374 on  the liability for defective products should be extended to cover data  safety)</li>
<li>The entity processing the data should be <strong>liable for data protection  breaches </strong>regardless of fault, and a fixed minimium compensation payment  for victims of data loss should be established (200 Euros?).</li>
<li><strong>It should be prohibited to disadvantage citizens </strong>who choose to  exercise their rights conferred in the directive (exercising them often  leads to the termination of the contract).</li>
<li><strong>A </strong><strong>right to use any information society service anonymously </strong>should be  introduced.</li>
<li><strong>A right to public information on data breaches </strong>should be included in  directive 95/46.</li>
<li><a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML">Article 10</a> of the directive should be amended so that the <strong>retention  period </strong>must be revealed (for how many years will the information retained?).</li>
<li><strong>Consenting clauses </strong>concerning personal data must be subject to  judicial review (Directive 93/13 of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in  consumer contracts should be extended)</li>
</ul>
<p>Some of these proposals are explained in more detail in a presentation <a href="http://webcast.ec.europa.eu/eutv/portal/jsf/player/index_player.html?id=7275&amp;pId=7256&amp;userlocale=en">(Video)</a> and in a document in German <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/events/conference_dp_2009/presentations_speeches/BREYER_Patrick.pdf">(pdf)</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Complaint on data retention kept secret [updated 24/02/10]</title>
		<link>http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/complaint-on-data-retention-kept-secret/</link>
		<comments>http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/complaint-on-data-retention-kept-secret/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 14:58:34 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.daten-speicherung.de/?p=1726</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Even after the European Court of Justice has rejected Ireland&#8217;s action against the directive on data retention, the European Commission, the German and the Irish autorities are refusing to release Ireland&#8217;s reasoning to the Court. To justify its decision, Ireland writes: If a request for Ireland’s submission to the European Court of Justice was submitted [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Even after the European Court of Justice has <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?where=&amp;lang=en&amp;num=79909789C19060301&amp;doc=T&amp;ouvert=T&amp;seance=ARRET">rejected</a> Ireland&#8217;s action against the directive on data retention, the European Commission, the German and the Irish autorities are refusing to release Ireland&#8217;s reasoning  to the Court.</p>
<p>To justify its decision, Ireland writes:</p>
<blockquote><p>If a request for Ireland’s submission to the European Court of Justice was submitted to this Department, it would be refused as our <strong>Freedom of Information legislation </strong>clearly states that it does not apply to a record is created by the Office of the Attorney General other than an administrative record. Section 46(1) refers. Whilst in this case the record was created on behalf of the AG, it is still the view of the section that should we receive a similar FOI then Section 4.6(1) would apply. It would not be appropriate for the record to be released on foot of an FOI request in Germany if the same request would be refused in Ireland.</p>
<p>Therefore in view of the foregoing please advise your counterparts in Germany that our view is that the record <strong>should be refused</strong>.</p></blockquote>
<p>The <strong>European Commission </strong>and German autorities have also refused to release the document under their freedom of information rules.</p>
<p>The content of Ireland&#8217;s application <strong>continues to be potentially useful</strong> as the German Federal Constitutional Court will hear several complaints against data retention in December. Earlier this year the Court <a href="http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-072en.html">decided</a> it would review whether Europe transgresses the competences conferred to it by the member states. In its application to the European Court of Justice, Ireland presumably set out reasons for why this is the case with the controversion directive on <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telecommunications_data_retention">data retention</a>.</p>
<p>We are thus still looking for somebody who will succeed in <strong>getting hold of a copy </strong>of Ireland&#8217;s application to the ECJ (case number C‑301/06) via the EU, a member state or by other means.</p>
<p>Update of 12 Dec 2009:</p>
<p>The documents have now been published on the Internet:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/ireland_2006-07-11.pdf">Ireland</a> 11/07/2006</li>
<li><a href="http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/council_2006-09-21.pdf">Council</a> 21/09/2006</li>
<li><a href="http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/parliament_2006-09-28.pdf">Parliament</a> 28/11/2006</li>
<li><a href="https://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/ireland_2006-11-28.pdf">Ireland</a> 28/11/2006</li>
<li><a href="http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/council_2007-02-05.pdf">Council</a> 05/02/2007</li>
<li><a href="http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/ep_2007-02-07.pdf">Parliament</a> 07/02/2007</li>
<li><a href="http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/slovak_2007-04-19.pdf">Slovak Republic</a> 19/04/2007</li>
<li><a href="http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/commission_2007-05-10.pdf">Commission</a> 10/05/2007</li>
<li><a href="http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/spain_2007-05-14.pdf">Spain</a> 14/05/2007</li>
<li><a href="http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/netherlands_2007-05-16.pdf">Netherlands</a> 16/05/2007</li>
<li><a href="http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/edps_2007-05-16.pdf">EDPS</a> 16/05/2007</li>
<li><a href="http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/ep_2007-09-17.pdf">Parliament</a> 17/09/2007</li>
<li><a href="http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/ecj_report_hearing_data_retention_2008-07-01.doc">Summary</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Court/2008/08-07-01_pleading_C301-06_EN.pdf">EDPS pleadings</a> 01/06/2008<a href="http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Court/2008/08-07-01_pleading_C301-06_EN.pdf"><br />
</a></li>
<li><a href="http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?where=&amp;lang=en&amp;num=79918985C19060301&amp;doc=T&amp;ouvert=T&amp;seance=CONCL">Advocate General</a> 14/10/2008</li>
<li><a href="http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?where=&amp;lang=en&amp;num=79909789C19060301&amp;doc=T&amp;ouvert=T&amp;seance=ARRET">Judgement</a> 10/02/2009</li>
</ul>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>European Court to decide on traceability of communications [2nd update]</title>
		<link>http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/european-court-to-decide-on-traceability-of-communications/</link>
		<comments>http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/european-court-to-decide-on-traceability-of-communications/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Oct 2008 15:13:21 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.daten-speicherung.de/?p=403</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The European Court of Human Rights is to decide on the complaint of a victim of identity theft (Application Number 2872/02). In 1999, an unidentified person published an advertisement for a homosexual relationship under the name of the applicant, a then 12 year old boy. The offender was not prosecuted because national law limited access [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <a href="http://echr.coe.int/">European Court of Human Rights</a> is to decide on the complaint of a victim of identity theft (Application Number 2872/02).</p>
<p>In 1999, an unidentified person published an advertisement for a homosexual relationship under the name of the applicant, a then 12 year old boy. The offender was not prosecuted because national law limited access to IP addresses to serious crime.</p>
<p>The applicant is complaining before the European Court of Human Rights that he had not had an effective remedy under national law to discover the identity of the perpetrator. On 27 June 2006 the Court <a href="http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&amp;documentId=810565&amp;portal=hbkm&amp;source=externalbydocnumber&amp;table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649">ruled</a> the complaint to be admissible as it raised serious issues of fact and law under the Convention and was not manifestly ill-founded.</p>
<p>An amicus curiae brief has now been submitted to the Court, pointing out that the outcome of the case could have far-reaching effects on the privacy of all European Internet users. A ruling requiring Contracting States to provide for the traceability of communications would have very serious consequences on user privacy.</p>
<p>According to the brief, freedom of expression on the Internet is protected under Article 10 of the Convention. The privacy of communications is protected under Article 8 of the Convention. &#8222;Considering the importance of those freedoms and the fact that their benefits by far outweigh the damage caused by their abuse, the Convention requires the creation of effective mechanisms for having illegal content on the Internet removed, but does not require traceability of Internet publishers or users.&#8220;</p>
<p>The brief is available <a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/data/amicus_curiae_brief_2008-10-07.pdf">on-line</a> for more details. The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights is already involved in the case.</p>
<p>See also:</p>
<ul>
<li>IT Law in Ireland: <a href="http://www.tjmcintyre.com/2008/10/european-court-of-human-rights-to-hear.html">European Court of Human Rights to hear case on whether online victims have a right to identify internet users</a> (3 October 2008)</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Update of 28 October 2008:</strong></p>
<p>The Court has rejected the brief mentioned above. A letter dated 20 October 2008 reads: &#8222;Having examined the matter in light of Rule 44 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the President of the Chamber has decided to refuse your request as it has not been submitted within the time allowed (Rule 44 § 2 (b)) and having regard to the state of the proceedings in the case.&#8220;</p>
<p>Rule 44 § 2 states:</p>
<blockquote><p>(a) Once notice of an application has been given to the respondent Contracting Party under Rule 51 § 1 or Rule 54 § 2 (b), the President of the Chamber may, in the interests of the proper administration of justice, as provided in Article 36 § 2 of the Convention, invite, or grant leave to, any Contracting Party which is not a party to the proceedings, or any person concerned who is not the applicant, to submit written comments or, in exceptional cases, to take part in a hearing.</p>
<p>(b) Requests for leave for this purpose must be duly reasoned and submitted in writing in one of the official languages as provided in Rule 34 § 4 not later than twelve weeks after notice of the application has been given to the respondent Contracting Party. Another time limit may be fixed by the President of the Chamber for exceptional reasons.</p></blockquote>
<p><strong>Update of 4 November 2008:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&amp;documentId=843777&amp;portal=hbkm&amp;source=externalbydocnumber&amp;table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649">Judgement of the Court</a> finding Finland in violation of the Convention but not requiring the retention of communications data</li>
<li><a href="http://daten-speicherung.de/data/amicus_curiae_brief_2008-10-07.pdf">Brief critical to the resulting traceability</a></li>
</ul>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Data retention and the German constitution</title>
		<link>http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/data-retention-and-the-german-constitution/</link>
		<comments>http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/data-retention-and-the-german-constitution/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Aug 2007 16:25:05 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[Excerpt from an e-mail of 2007/08/08: If the German parliament passes the bill on data retention later this year, we will file a complaint with the German Constitutional Court arguing that a blanket retention of the entire population&#8217;s communications data is grossly disproportionate and violates the German constitution. The German Constitutional Court has already ruled [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Excerpt from an e-mail of 2007/08/08:</p>
<blockquote><p> If the German parliament passes the bill on data retention later this year, we will file a complaint with the German Constitutional Court arguing that a blanket retention of the entire population&#8217;s communications data is grossly disproportionate and violates the German constitution. The German Constitutional Court has already ruled rather clearly that this is indeed the case.</p></blockquote>
<blockquote></blockquote>
<blockquote><p>However, the directive as part of the &#8222;aquis commun&#8220; takes precedence even over the German constitution. So the only thing the Court can do is</p>
<p>a. order that the application of the German transposition act be suspended</p></blockquote>
<blockquote><p>b. apply for a preliminary ruling (Art. 234 TEC) by the ECJ on whether the DR directive violates human rights as enshrined in European law.</p>
<p>For as long as the directive is in force, the German Constitutional Court is unlikely to declare unconstitutional an act merely transposing European obligations into national law, as such a ruling would entail a major constitutional crisis in the EU.</p>
<p>However, if the ECJ declares the directive void (no matter on which grounds), the German Constitutional Court will be free to declare the German law unconstitutional as this would no longer conflict with European obligations.</p>
<p>By the way: Even if the directive was re-enacted as a framework decision, framework decisions do not have precedence over national constitutional law, according to our Constititional Court (Reason: no co-decision of the European Parliament). So even this scenario would be a major breakthrough. Anyway, a framework decision would require unanimity which did not and is not going to happen.</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded>
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